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PREUJDE TO R. v. Waltz, R. v. Xruize, R. v. lfcLennan, 
Thompson v. The Queen and Hufsky v. The Queen (Pages 2 to 13 Inclusive) 
These four reasons for judgement ought to be of considerable interest to 
practicing police officers who encounter and process drinking drivers. The 
last of these judgements, by the Supreme Court of Canada is of interest in 
that it finally answers in addition to questions about roadside breath tests 
the crucial question if stopping motorist without specific reason causes 
arbitrary detention. 
The roadside breath test is not practiced in British Columbia, but as is 
hinted in the arguments before the B.C. Court of Appeal in the McLennan case 
it and the roadside physical sobriety test may, in law, have similarities 
despite the substantial differences between the two: the one being compulsory 
upon demand and the other being voluntary and not provided for in law. 
Regrettably the B.C. Court of Appeal did not have the benefit of the Supreme 
Court of Canada decision on implied practical considerations despite the 
detention triggered by the stopping, demand for roadside breath, or as in the 
B.C. case a request to perform certain physical tests. Had the B.C. Court of 
Appeal had that benefit it may well have gone further afield on this issue . 
In any event the grouping and sequence of the cases is to demonstrate the 
legal problems with this matter of detention upon being stopped and the 
response of the Supreme Court of Canada and our B.C. Court of Appeal to these 
issues. 
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IS nmRE ANY DIFFERENCE, Ill TERMS OF DETENTION, 
BETWEEN A SOBRIETY TEST RESULTING IN A 24 HOUR ROADSIDE 
SUSPENSION AND ONE LF.ADING TO A DEMAND FOR BRFAm SAKPLES? 
Regina v. WALTZ - Vancouver County Court -
Vancouver CA870950 - April 1988 
Police saw a drunken passenger alight from a car. Assuming that where there 
is a drunken passenger there may be a drinking driver, they stopped the car. 
Consumption of alcohol had affected the driver and he was prohibited from 
driving for a 24 hour period which he apparently ignored as he was found 
driving a few minutes later. The prerequisite beliefs the peace officer must 
have to impose a 24 hour suspension, were obtained by having the suspect 
perform some sobriety tests. The accused simply claimed that he was detained 
when stopped and asked to perform the tests. The officers had not advised him 
of his rights to counsel and this infringement of his right should cause the 
suppression of the test results. This meant that the officer had no proof of 
his grounds to suspend, and therefore, there was no suspension and his 
conviction of driving while prohibited was not founded in law argued the 
accused in the Vancouver County Court. 
To support his arguments based on the Charter infringement and consequential 
exclusion of evidence the accused relied heavily on a decision by the B.C. 
Court of Appeal.* Tha~ court held that the roadside sobriety test was due to 
a lack of advice of right to counsel, inadmissible in evidence, and 
consequently, a criminal allegation of impaired driving failed to result in a 
conviction. After all, if the reasonable and probable grounds to make the 
demand arise from the physical performance of a suspect while performing the 
sobriety test, then exclusion of the evidence also erases the justification 
for the demand, reasoned the accused. 
This County Court judge did not agree with the accused's argument. He aligned 
himself with other judicial opinions particularly where persons are charged 
with ftover 80 mlg". In the case decided by the B.C. Court of Appeal the 
evidence became inadmissible to prove the impairment, but not to invalidate 
the demand for breath samples. For instance, police may make a demand based 
on information from what they consider to be a reliable third party. Such is 
then only evidence to prove prerequisites for the demand and not to prove 
guilt in respect to impaired driving or "over 80 mlgft. Should this reasoning 
be erroneous in law the question is: whether without the evidence resulting 
from road test, were there reasonable and probable grounds for the officer to 
impose the 24 hour suspension? The answer was NNoft, and consequently, the 
situation here was indistinguishable from the binding precedent set by the 
B.C. Court of Appeal in Bonogofski. Not knowing what the sobriety will lead 
to (either a 24 hour suspension or demand for breath samples) results in the 
person who is only prohibited from driving being detained during the test , 
* R. v. BONOGOFSKI. See Volume 29 page 1 of this publication . Also 19 
B.C.L.R . (2d) 360 . 
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like those who because they failed the test are subjected to a demand for 
breath samples. Due to the Charter violation the accused's appeal was 
allowed. 
Conviction for Driving 'While 
Prohibited Set Aside. 
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RIGHTS GIVEN AFrER. ROADSIDE SOBRIETY TEST 
WEN DID THE OFFICER. FORM THE OPINION PREREQUISITE TO THE DEMAND? 
Regina v. XRIJIZE - County Court of Westminster 
Chilliwack No. 16808 - March 1988. 
The officer stopped the accused for speeding and erratic driving. The 
constable knew the accused and testified that he found him to be different 
from nnormal times when I've seen him sobern and cited all the usual symptoms 
of impairment he had detected. He then requested the accused to perform a 
roadside sobriety test, after which he read him the usual Charter right and 
made a demand for samples of his breath which he refused to provide. This 
resulted in a conviction for doing so. 
The accused appealed arguing that the constable's evidence of the demand 
should not have been admitted. The prerequisite grounds for making that 
demand were obtained by a means that had infringed the accused's right to 
counsel. When he was told to perform the sobriety test he was detained and 
should have been made aware of his rights at that time. 
There were two issues in this appeal. If the constable had formed the 
opinion that the accused was impaired prior to the sobriety test, the demand 
he made may be valid despite the subsequent infringement of the accused's 
right to counsel. If, however, the prerequisite opinion to the demand was 
formed due to what the officer observed during the roadside sobriety test then 
that evidence was obtained directly in a manner that infringed a guaranteed 
right. 
The constable did testify: "Well, I definitely believed that he was impaired" 
but failed to say when he formed that opinion. 
The Court held that the transcript of the trial was of no assistance in 
determining these points. Furthermore, even if the opinion was formed prior 
to the sobriety test, the trial court must determine if the subsequent 
infringement of the accused's right to counsel would affect the admissibility 
of the demand. 
Comment: 
Appeal Allowed. 
New Trial Ordered. 
Defence counsel in this case relied on the decision by the B.C. Court of 
Appeal that a person asked to perform a roadside sobriety test is detained.* 
In that case the Court of Appeal reiterated that where an officer complies 
* R. v. Bonogofski, Volume 29, page 1 of this publication. 
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with the law as it is at the time , he/she acts in good faith.* Usually such 
a finding will result in evidence being admitted despite the fact that since 
that time precedent rendered the officer's actions contrary to the Charter or 
common law. 
However, in this as well as the Bonogofski case decided by the B.C. Court of 
Appeal, the issues surrounded the detention triggered by the roadside sobriety 
test. At the time the constable in this Kruize case apprehended the accused 
the B.C. Court of Appeal had not yet set the precedent that performing such a 
test upon request causes detention. Quite distinct from the Gladstone case 
where the officers had followed investigative procedures that at the time were 
in compliance with the common law, the constables in these two drinking/ 
driving cases were not complying with some precedent that established that 
suspected impaired drivers are not detained when asked to perform a sobriety 
test prior to the demand. There was no case law on this point and they only 
believed that there was no detention at that stage of their investigation--a 
belief the courts subsequently found to be erroneous in law. That is the 
reason why the B.C. Court of Appeal did not apply the Gladstone decision, to 
their decision in the Bonogofski case, according to the County Court Judge. 
***** 
A day after the Kruize decision was handed down by the Westminster County 
Court, the County Court of Vancouver Island decided on a case that appears on 
all fours with this Kruize case. Needless to say the Judges did not have the 
benefit of being aware of one another's deliberations. 
The Vancouver Island case is Regina v. Pare (Courtenay No. 87/2107). The 
accused was stopped in a road block (no issue was made of this), and he and 
his passenger were found not to be wearing seat belts. While the officer 
completed the necessary documents for this offence, he noticed the accused's 
flushed face, the smell of an alcoholic beverage and bloodshot eyes. When 
asked to do a sobriety test the accused had difficulty in alighting from his 
car, and when he followed the officer to the police car it was obvious that he 
was impaired. The officer testified that he had formed the opinion that the 
accused's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol when the accused was still 
sitting in his car. 
The officer did the same as his colleagues in the Kruize and Bonogofski cases; 
he asked the accused to perform a sobriety test and then made the demand, 
followed by making him aware of his right to counsel. This caused the same 
arguments to arise as in the Kruize case in relation to the validity of the 
demand. However, here the evidence was clear at what stage the officer formed 
the beliefs prerequisite to the demand. Nonetheless, defence counsel argued 
that all evidence be excluded due to the infringement of the accused's right 
by detaining him, collecting additional evidence and then telling him of his 
Charter right. The trial judge had agreed and the Crown appealed the 
acquittal that came as a consequence. 
* R. v. Glads~one, Volume 22, page 22 of this publication. 
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Though it is generally established that a detained person should not be 
required to do anything that may incriminate himjher unless the detainee has 
been given the right to s~eak with a lawyer, it was held by another Vancouver 
Island County Court Judge that where the officer does have the grounds 
prerequisite to the demand prior to the roadside sobriety test, then the 
results of the breathalyzer tests and the certificate of analyses are still 
admissible so long as prior to the breath samples being taken the accused was 
made aware of his Charter right to counsel. 
Apparently accepting the finding of his brother judge, it was held that the 
trial judge had been wrong in not allowing the analyst's certificate in 
evidence. The trial judge had found as a fact that the officer's opinion was 
formed before any sobriety tests. Therefore excluding the roadside sobriety 
test from the evidence did not deprive the Crown's Case from evidence that may 
prove that the officer had the necessary grounds to make the demand. 
This County Court Judge in the Pare case raised another interesting point that 
in his opinion must receive consideration in circumstances like these. When 
an officer believes on reasonable and probable grounds that a person is 
committing or has in the last two hours committed one of the well known 
drinking/driving offences, he "may" make a demand forthwith. The "may" refers 
to whether or not he feels he needs the analyses of breath or blood and does 
not refer to the Hforthwith". In this case the officer had his grounds, but 
took another five minutes to conduct a sobriety test before he made the 
demand. The test was not something, in the circumstances, that could be 
considered to be included in the alternative to "forthwith", "as soon as 
practicableH. The latter was put into the law to take care of extenuating 
circumstances. Such a delay is capable of invalidating a demand for breath 
samples, reasoned the Court. As these and other matters had been inadequately 
considered, the Crown's Appeal was allowed . 
New Trial was Directed. 
*Pelletier v. The Queen, December 18 , 1987, Victoria 42298 . 
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ADMISSIBILITY OF •ROADSIDE SOBRIETY TEST EVIDENCE• 
Regina v.HcLENNAN - B.C . Court of Appeal -
Vancouver CA 008490 
An alert was put out to locate a car the driver of which was reported to be 
impaired. The car was spotted and shortly after found parked with the 
accused behind the wheel. After failing a roadside sobriety test, the accused 
was demanded to give samples of his breath and was arrested for impaired 
driving when he refused to accompany the officer. He was then made aware of 
his right to counsel. 
The officer testified that he did not believe he had sufficient grounds to 
make his demand until he saw the accused's failing performance of the physical 
test on the side of the road, hence the test was for the purpose of collecting 
evidence. The trial judge had held that during the sobriety test the accused 
was not detained, and therefore, the officer had not infringed the accused's 
Charter right. The evidence of the test was admitted and the accused was 
convicted of both charges. He appealed the convictions. 
Just five months before the B.C. Court of Appeal gave its decision in this 
case it handed down its reasons for judgement in a nearly identical case.* 
Summing up what it decided with that previous case the Court of Appeal said: 
" ... where an accused has been detained and where a police 
constable thereafter is engaged in obtaining evidence to 
support a charge of impaired driving and required the 
accused to perform road-side physical tests, if the 
accused is not informed of his section lO(b) rights prior 
to the demand to perform the road-side physical tests, the 
evidence of the results of those tests is not admissible". 
The B.C. Court of Appeal decided that the accused was in fact detained when he 
performed his physical tests. He had not been made aware of his rights to 
counsel at that point, and therefore, this right had been infringed. For the 
purpose of supporting the allegation of impaired driving the evidence of the 
road test was inadmissible. 
The question remaining was whether the evidence of the roadside physical test 
was admissible to show the officer had grounds to make the demand for breath 
samples. This in turn, would cause this evidence to support the charge of 
refusing to give such samples. In the Bonogofski case the charge had been one 
of impaired driving. 
The Crown had expressed considerable concern over this issue. The roadside 
sobriety test is no different from other police investigations where an 
* Regina v. BONOGOFSKI, unreported , Volume 29 page 1 of this publication. 
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officer asks questions and makes observations in an attempt to discover if an 
offence has been committed and to identify the author of it. By the officer's 
own evidence he attempted to determine if there were grounds to make the 
demand for breath samples. The test is similar in purpose to the demand for a 
breath sample in a roadside screening device in other provinces (this device 
and the law providing for its use is not applied in B.C.). A number of cases* 
have established in Saskatchewan, Ontario, Manitoba, Nova Scotia and Alberta 
that a person is not detained when demanded to give a sample of breath for 
analysis in a roadside screening device. If inquiries to determine the 
existence of grounds constitute detention then such interpretation of the 
Charter is excessive, extravagant and leads to absurdities that paralyze law 
enforcement argued the Crown. The cases involving roadside screening device 
tests emphasize that the demand may be made upon suspicion and that the law 
providing for it clearly attempts to remedy the omnipresent grey area between 
suspicion and the reasonable and probable grounds prerequisite to the demand, 
for breath samples for analysis by the breathalyzer. If the latter is the 
case there is no doubt of detention** and a right to the advice that a lawyer 
may be consulted. The heart of the issue the Crown placed before the B.C. 
Court of Appeal is: "What is the difference?" In terms of purpose the 
roadside physical test in this case was indistinguishable from the purposes 
for which the roadside screening devices were used in all the cases where it 
was found that at that stage there is no detention. The law and the 
application of the Charter as outlined in those cases has struck the perfect 
balance between the Charter rights of the individual and the legitimate 
objectives of society to deter the drinking driving habits of some (many?) . 
The B.C. Court of Appeal declined to belabour the issue of the distinction (if 
any) between the physical roadside test and that done by means of the 
screening device. However, the Court held that the physical test triggered 
detention and by implication seemed to hold that an infringement of the right 
to counsel at that stage, also justifies suppression of the evidence gathered 
by that test to support the legitimacy of the demand for a "real" breath test. 
Not specifically dealing with the roadside test ~ssue the Court gratuitously 
commented that it is understandable that officers may forget to issue the 
Charter advice when making the demand for submission to the real breath test. 
This can be remedied by overlooking an initial refusal , repeating the demand 
and then advising the suspect of his rights. 
* R -egina 
Regina. 
Regina. 
Regina. 
Regina 
v. 
v. 
v. 
v. 
v. 
TALBOURDET (1984) 12 C.C.C. (3d) 173. (Saskatchewan) 
BURKHART (1986) 49 C.R. (3d) 376. (Manitoba) 
DRAPEAIJ (1986) 48 C.R. (3d) 185. (Nova Scotia) 
PHILLIPS; R. v. REID (1986) 26 C.C.C. (3d) 60. (Alberta) 
SEO (1986) 25 C.C.C. (3d) 385. (Ontario) 
** R. v. Therens. V 1 21 1 f th" bl" o ume page o 1s pu 1cation (Supreme Court of 
Canada). 
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Accused ' s Appeal Allowed. 
Acquittal's Directed for Both Counts. 
Conunent: 
The B.C. Court of Appeal has been rather conservative in applying the Charter 
as compared to its counterparts in other provinces. In this issue the 
situation is reversed. The media recently reported that the Ontario Court of 
Appeal had held that the physical roadside test in the absence of an arrest 
having been effected, does not constitute detention regardless of the purpose 
of test. 
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RANDOM STOPPING OF CARS - ROADSIDE BREATHTESTS - RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
'QNREA50NABLE SEARCH AND THE CHARTER AND BILL OF RIGHTS 
Thompson v. The Queen and t:he At:t:o.rney General of Canada -
Hufsky v. The Queen and t:he At:t:o.rney General of Canada -
Supreme Court of Canada - April 1988 
Mr. Thompson was stopped by a constable who was engaged in spot checks of 
vehicles. He stopped the Thompson car because it had one headlight out and 
detected a strong smell of alcohol on Thompson's breath. A demand to blow 
into a roadside screening device was met by a blunt refusal. The officer 
explained his reasons for making the demand, but was again told that no breath 
for the purpose of analysis in the A.L.E.R.T. instrument was forthcoming. 
There was no arrest and no advice as to his right to counsel. An appearance 
notice was served on Mr. Thompson and his driver's licence was suspended 
temporarily. No arrest was effected at any time. 
Mr. Thompson eventually took his case to the Supreme Court of Canada claiming 
that the officer had detained him and that his right to counsel had been 
infringed. 
Mr. Hufsky was stopped by police for no reason at all and a demand for a 
sample of his breath to be used in a roadside screening device was made. He 
also refused. He was made aware of the offence he committed by refusing and 
was then told of his right to counsel. No arrest was effected he too was 
served with an appearance notice in regard to the refusal. Mr. Hufsky also 
took his plight to the Supreme Court of Canada. His grounds for appeal were: 
(1) Section 234.l C.C. is not universally proclaimed in Canada. 
Consequently there are provinces where the refusal could not be an 
offence. This constitutes inequality before the law contrary to the 
Bill of Rights (1960); 
(2) Random stopping of cars infringes the right not to be arbitrarily 
detained; and 
(3) The spot check by police amounted to an infringement of the right to 
be secure against unreasonable search. 
The purpose of the spot checks had been to check the documents (i.e. drivers' 
licenses, registration and insurance), the mechanical fitness of the car, and 
the driver's sobriety. In the Hufsky case a number of officers were involved 
and the officers testified that cars were stopped randomly at the discretion 
of the officers without guidelines, criteria, standards or procedural policies 
to determine what vehicles should be stopped. The officer had during his 
eight month assignment of this kind of work stopped at least 500 cars and 
performed numerous roadside breath tests as a result. 
In the provinces of British Columbia and Quebec, the provisions of s. 234.2 
are not in force. The Supreme Court of Canada held that this was done for 
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valid federal objectives that does not violate the 1960 Bill of Rights (which 
assures all Canadians of equality before the law). 
To make its case that the spot check infringed the right not to be arbitrarily 
detained, the defence had the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Dedman v. 
The Queen* as a threshold. Reference was made to the Ontario Highway Traffic 
Act's provisions that compel drivers to carry the well known documents and to 
produce them for inspection upon demand of a peace officer. This act 
authorizes police officers to stop motor vehicles, creates an offence for 
those who do not comply, and specifically provides that a police officer may 
stop motor vehicles to determine whether there is evidence to make a demand 
for a roadside breath test under s. 234.1 C.C. 
The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously concluded that being stopped by police 
caused Mr. Hufsky to be detained. Police assumed control over his movements, 
and there were significant and possibly legal consequences for him. Then 
there was the demand for a roadside breath test and needless to say that also 
caused detention, quite distinct from the stopping itself. Refusing 
constitutes an offence and the accused was in a position where he had a right 
to legal advice. Despite the fact that the results of a roadside breath 
analysis "could not be introduced against the appellant" it might lead to a 
demand for breath samples under s. 235(1) C.C.; the stopping and the demand 
separately caused detention. Consequently the appellants (Thompson and 
Hufsky) seemed entitled to have been advised of their right to counsel. 
Needless to say that at a roadside the exercise of such right would in many 
cases be impossible and render the objectives of s. 234.1(1) C.C. ineffective. 
To deal with this issue the Supreme Court of Canada turned to section 1 of the 
Charter. This section guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in the 
Charter and states that any law that limits those rights and freedoms must be 
reasonable and be justified in a free and democratic society. This would make 
one believe that only statute law and regulations can be tested against this 
section. However, the Supreme Court of Canada held that also operational 
requirements and the application of common law are subject to the Hs. 1 testH. 
The Court concluded: 
"It need not be an explicit limitation of a particular 
right or freedom." 
Section 234.l C.C. stipulates compliance with a demand for a breath sample 
"forthwith", wheres. 235(1) C.C. dictates compliance as soon as practicable 
and within two hours, etc. The self explanatory, implied, operational require-
ments under s.234.1 C.C. are a limitation of the right to counsel (considering 
that the demand triggers detention) as there is simply no opportunity for 
contact with counsel prior to giving the breath sample at the "roadside". Now 
the question is whether this operational requirement is a reasonable 
limitation of the right to counsel in a free and democratic society. 
*Dedman v. The Queen [1985 ] 2 S.C.R.2 , or Volume 22 , page 17 of this 
publication. 
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The drinking driver is a serious, recognized problem in traffic, not only in 
Canada, but anywhere. This problem has not been controlled and must be 
addressed with urgent measures to prevent the serious injuries caused by the 
drinking drivers. Increased penalties are ineffective while probability of 
apprehension is the most effective deterrent. The provisions contained in and 
implied by the roadside breath test laws are, therefore, a reasonable 
limitation to the right to counsel when a demand is made for a roadside breath 
sample held the court. 
The officer had a reason for stopping him. However, in Hufsky's situation the 
stop, and hence the detention, were completely at random, and consequently, 
appeared to be a violation of the Charter right not to be arbitrarily 
detained. The Ontario traffic laws, as they do in most provinces, authorize 
the stopping of motor vehicles without any prerequisite conditions or grounds. 
The road check was therefore an implicit operational requirement of this 
legislative provision, and therefore, also subject to the s. 1 (Charter) 
test. 
The Supreme Court of Canada recognized that driving is a licensed activity 
that requires rigid monitoring and firm enforcement considering what citizens 
do to each other on our highways. Considering also that many infractions have 
no external manifestations, reasonable cause as a prerequisite to stopping a 
motor vehicle would render enforcement of many regulations impossible. How 
can we tell from observation, that a driver is not licensed, or that there is 
no insurance, that the automobile is defective, or indeed that the driver has 
been drinking? Again, only the perceived risk of detection is an essential 
deterrent to comply with the laws that reduce the perils of using the public 
roads. Rejecting the American 1uris prudence of reasonable cause, our highest 
Court unanimously decided that the provincial traffic laws allowing the 
stopping of motorists without restrictions, are a reasonable intrusion and a 
limitation of the right not to be arbitrarily detained that is demonstrably 
justified in our free and democratic society. 
In the Dedman case (supra) the Court had stipulated that road checks were a 
reasonable limitation of our rights provided it is part of a publicized 
program. The Court added the following to this rule: 
"As for publicity, which was referred to in Dedman in 
connection with the common law authority for a random stop 
for the purposes contemplated by the R.I.D.E. program, I 
think it may be taken now that the public is well aware of 
random stop authority both because of its frequent and 
widespread exercise and its recognition by legislatures." 
This left only one issue: is the requirement to produce documents for 
inspection providing for an unreasonable search? The Supreme Court of Canada 
held that there is no search involved as the legislation providing for this 
does not constitute an intrusion on a reasonable expectation of privacy. The 
documents are required by law, and an inspection of them is not a search as 
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they indicate a status or "compliance with some legal requirement" connected 
with the exercise of a privilege or right. 
Both Appeals Were Dismissed. 
The Dedman decision was decided on the common law function and status of a 
police constable in Canada and is interesting reading in conjunction with 
these cases. Also note that the practical operational requirement that 
justifies suspension of the right to counsel warning in relation to the 
drinking driver only applies in the case of a roadside breath test. 
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llORDKR. - VALIDITY OF SF.ARCH WARRANT- RF.ASONABLE SEARCH 
ADK!SSIBILITY OF STATEMENTS - GOOD FAITH ON PART OF POLICE 
Regina v. lfORAN - Ontario Court of Appeal 
36 c.c.c. (3d) 225 
The accused had for years an affair with a married woman who lived not far 
from his home. The woman was found murdered in the basement of her home. A 
few days later police phoned the accused and made him aware they were speaking 
to all people who knew her and they also wanted to speak with him. They 
offered to come to his home, or if he wished, he could come to their office. 
An hour later the accused arrived at the police station. He was thanked for 
coming and he in turn expressed to be pleased to do anything to assist. 
The accused told police of his affair with the deceased and that just the day 
before she met her death he had lunch with her in a restaurant. She had asked 
him if suicide would affect a life insurance policy. He had admonished her 
for what she implied. Police had not viewed the accused as a suspect before, 
during or immediately following the interview. 
Four days later the accused was again invited to come to the police station 
and clear up a few points. An inspector questioned him this time. The 
accused conceded that he had not told all at the first interview. He told how 
during the drive the deceased had thrown her glasses on the dashboard and had 
attempted to jump out of the car. He had, with great difficulty, prevented 
this. He also told how the deceased phoned him routinely around 1000 hours, 
but had not done so on the day of her death. In view of what happened the day 
before, the inspector found it strange that the accused had not phoned her to 
see if she was alright. He was pressed, if not cross-examined, on this point. 
Consequently, the accused told how she had phoned him at 1230 hours and had 
screamed over the phone and had hung up on him. He had rushed over to her 
house and had found her in a pool of blood in the basement. He had panicked 
and had gone straight home again. 
Police had not advised the accused of his right to remain silent or his right 
to counsel. The trial judge had found that the accused was not detained 
during either statement; rather, that they were voluntarily given and were 
admissible in evidence. 
A few weeks later police applied for a search warrant for the accused's house 
and all buildings on his property. The warrant was apparently executed in 
relation to a building or shed in the absence of the accused. The murder 
weapon was found and put back in the same place. Prior to the expiration of 
the warrant police staked out in the shed to see if the accused would come for 
the knife. He did come, but prior to him making any move for the weapon, 
police had to leave or be discovered. When the accused came to the shed the 
search warrant had expired. 
The defence called the Justice of the Peace who had granted the warrant as a 
defence witness and showed that although there was evidence in the information 
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defence witness and showed that although there was evidence in the information 
upon which he could judicially have found that the officer had reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe that evidence related to the murder could be found 
on the accused's property, he had not given it such consideration. He had 
used a seven point checklist which did not include this essential ingredient 
to a search warrant. No-one questioned the propriety of a member of the 
judiciary testifying as to his mental processes in making a judicial decision, 
and the trial judge had found on the basis of that testimony that the warrant 
was invalid. However, the police had not known this, and therefore, acted in 
good faith. Despite the search being unreasonable, the evidence was admitted. 
In regard to the stake out and what the officers had observed the trial judge 
had found that the accused had failed to show on the balance of probabilities 
that admitting the evidence of him searching for the material he had hidden in 
the shed would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. That 
evidence had also been admitted. 
The accused appealed these decisions by the trial judge. In regards to the 
statements he said he would not have given them if he had known he did not 
have to do so. He also would have consulted a lawyer if he had been made 
aware of his right to consult one. Furthermore, in view of the sensitivity in 
regards to the affair, he had given the statements "off the record". 
The Ontario Court of Appeal rejected all the grounds for the accused appealing 
his conviction of second degree murder . He had a fair trial and the trial 
judge's decisions were without error. 
Accused ' s Appeal Dismissed. 
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IS A PER.SON WHO IGNORES A •nEMAND•. DETAINED? 
Regina v. SCHHAUTZ - B.C. Court of Appeal -
Vancouver CA 006527 - February 1988. 
At the scene of a 'hit and run' accident police were told where they could 
find the offending van and who drove it at the time of the accident. After 
being informed of his rights the accused was questioned in his living room. 
He responded to being told to have sideswiped another car and having been 
followed home: "If somebody followed me, I obviously did it," He said he had 
a little to drink before the accident, and "a lot" afterwards when he arrived 
home. He also claimed that he was unaware of the accident; "I didn't feel it" 
he said. 
In response to the demand to accompany the officers and supply samples of his 
breath the accused said: "You better get a lot of guys because I'm not coming 
with you." and with that he began to push the officers towards the door. He 
was then advised that he would receive a summons for failing to supply breath 
samples, and the officers left. 
The accused appealed the conviction for this offence saying that he was 
inadequately informed of his rights. He was informed of his rights when 
questioned regarding the hit and run, but not in relation to the demands made 
of him when the officers formed the opinion that the accused was intoxicated. 
This left the Court of Appeal to answer two questions: 
(1) Was the accused detained, considering his unhesitant reactions and 
response to the demand made of him? 
(2) Was there in the circumstances sufficient compliance with the 
accused's right to be informed of his right to retain , and instruct 
counsel? 
The case relied on by both parties to this criminal dispute was the Therens 
decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1985.* Mr. Therens complied with 
the demand to give samples of his breath, but was not told of his right to 
counsel. No arrest had been made as the compliance with the demand had been 
without any objections. The Supreme Court of Canada held that there was 
nonetheless detention within the meaning of s. lO(b) of the Charter. In 
essence the Supreme Court of Canada said that where a demand is made of a 
citizen or a direction is given by a person in authority, most will assume it 
to be lawful and "will err on the side of caution" and comply. This 
psychological compulsion causes a suspension of freedom of choice. 
Consequently there can be detention without threats of physical restraint. 
However, the perceived suspension of freedom on the part of the person to whom 
the direction was given or of whom the demand was made may effectively prevent 
* R. v. Therens. 18 C.C.C. (3d) 481 , or Volume 21, page 1 of this 
publication . 
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that person from exercising his/her right to counsel. Hence the 
constitutional obligation on the authorities to make any detained person aware 
of that right. 
This case has caused the courts to rule that a demand for breath samples 
causes detention instantly and the peace officer's duty to make the person 
aware of his/her right to counsel arises the moment the demand is made . This 
despite the following passage from the Therens case: 
" ... Detention may be effected without the application of 
physical restraint if the person concerned submits or 
acquiesces in the deprivation of liberty and reasonably 
believes that the choices to do otherwise does not exist." 
In other words, the Supreme Court of Canada does not seem to say that the mere 
making of the demand constitutes detention "regardless of the person's 
reaction at the time of receiving the demand". Our highest court identified 
two requirements for detention without arrest: (1) a demand or direction, and 
(2) that the person submits to the deprivation of liberty in which he 
reasonably believes he has no choice. 
The accused's reaction to the demand was hardly an indication that he 
submitted himself to a deprivation of his liberty. As a matter of fact he did 
the opposite. He clearly indicated not to be coerced or in any way to be 
under any obligation to comply with the demand. He ushered the officers out 
of his door and was not threatened with arrest or criminal consequences. He 
remained in his home, "free to sit by his fireside and consume more alcohol or 
phone his lawyer should he see fit to do so". 
The B.C. Court of Appeal reiterated the above described reason for s. lO(b) 
(make detained persons aware of their right to counsel) of the Charter and 
said in the same breath that it was not to alert people of legal jeopardy or 
deter them from committing offenses. 
To summarize it can be said that our B.C. Court of Appeal held that in the 
absence of an arrest being effected; 
(1) The mere making of a demand for breath samples does not by itself 
cause the suspect to be detained; 
(2) To be detained subsequent to a demand or lawful direction there must 
be a restraint of liberty by means of compulsion that causes the 
person to submit or acquiesce to the restraint; and 
(3) The detention must be one which may have significant legal 
consequences and which may prevent or impede access to counsel. 
The accused in this case had considered himself free of any restraints, 
deprivation or legal obligations, and consequently, he had not been detained 
at any time during his encounter with police in his home. 
Was the one only Charter warning of right to counsel sufficient? The B.C. 
Court of Appeal answered: "Yes " . 
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"When one considers the nebulous nature of the 
circumstances which may in law constitute a detention or 
arrest, one can appreciate that an officer acting out of 
an abundance of caution to ensure that the accused is 
fully aware of his rights, may choose to give the advice 
at the commencement of an investigation .... " 
This effectively will remove any doubt that the person was at all times fully 
aware of his/her right to counsel. Depending how much time has elapsed 
between contacts with the suspect, one warning may suffice. In this case 
there was the demand made ten minutes after the warning was given. This 
satisfied the Court that the accused's right to be informed of his rights to 
counsel had not been infringed. 
Accused's Appeal Dismissed. 
Note: 
The three Justices who heard this appeal were not unanimous in this decision. 
One Justice wrote dissenting reasons for judgement and he would have allowed 
the accused's appeal and have directed a verdict of acquittal. He was of the 
opinion that the Supreme Court of Canada meant to say that making a demand or 
giving a lawful direction triggered detention without consideration to the 
reaction of the person subject to that demand or direction. The dissenting 
Justice of the Court of Appeal did not disagree with the definition of 
detention as outlined by his two colleagues; however, he seemed to say that 
the essential components could exist alternatively to constitute detention 
where the majority judgement applied them conjunctively. In other words 
physical control; assumption of control by a demand or direction with 
significant legal consequences; .QI psychological compulsion in the form of a 
reasonably perception of suspension of freedom of choice are capable of 
triggering detention. In essence the majority of the Court substituted the or 
for and, and did thereby say that only if all the essentials exist is there 
detention. Judging by its reiteration of previous decisions on this point in 
the Thompson and Hufsky cases (see page 3) the dissenting voice in this 
Schautz case may well be right. 
Furthermore, the dissenting member was of the view that the decision of the 
Court created the unacceptable paradox: 
"A person who complies with the demand is entitled to be 
told that he may retain counsel to advise him that he is 
acting in accordance with the law; but a person who 
refuses to comply with the demand is not entitled to be 
told that he may retain counsel to advise him that he is 
acting contrary to law and can expect to be prosecuted." 
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In terms of the Charter advice the officers gave the accused at the outset of 
their conversation with him in which they questioned him in regards to the 
accident first and then (10 minutes later) made the demand for breath samples, 
was not in compliance with the requirements intended by section lO(b) of the 
Charter, said the dissenting Justice. The demand was key to the detention 
that made the Charter advice mandatory. The officers, by not giving the 
advice again, had failed to link the right to counsel to the demand. The 
dissenting Justice also concluded that the accused was probably detained when 
the officers entered his home and questioned him. He agreed with the B.C. 
Supreme Court* that an already detained person who has been advised of his 
Charter right to counsel can be newly detained and become entitled to be 
advised again. , (Brown was questioned on an aggravated assault and advised ; 
fourteen days later he was questioned regarding a murder and was not advised) . 
The fact that the B.C. Court of Appeal was not unanimous, gives the accused an 
access as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada for further appeal. This 
issue has also been before the Courts of Appeal of Alberta, Ontario and Prince 
Edward Island. They all concluded as this dissenting Justice did. That makes 
B.C. on this and other Charter issues, unique. 
* R. v. Brawn (1986 B.C.S.C . CC85003 ) . 
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•THER.E COMES A TIME A PERSON IS SO SURROUNDED BY IHCR.IKIHA.TIHG 
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HE EI'l11ER EXPIAINS OR STANDS CONDEMNED• 
Regina v. WELTER - B.C. Court of Appeal -
CA 006144 - Vancouver Registry - February 1988 
The accused lived together with her common law husband and another woman. 
The husband is a truck driver and away from home quite frequently. 
Police searched the house when only the women were home and found garbage bags 
of marihuana and all the paraphernalia that someone was trafficking the 
narcotic. Over seven thousand dollars in cash was found in the accused's 
purse and a paper bag. No fingerprints belonging to the accused were found on 
the paraphernalia and she refused to admit knowledge of what the garbage bags 
contained. She did, however, .admit that the money was her' s as well as the 
scales. There was no explanation to police or in testimony where the funds 
came from or the presence of the marihuana. 
The burden is exclusively on the Crown to prove all the ingredients of an 
alleged offence and the accused has a right to remain silent at all times. 
That is the presumption of innocence in a nutshell. Consequently, one would 
presume that the Crown did not have a case against the accused. However, the 
trial judge had held that living in a house full of narcotics, drugs and 
equipment to package it for the purpose of sale as well as an unusual 
quantity of money (the ultimate reward of trafficking) begs for an 
explanation, in the absence of which the occupant (the accused) had possession 
and control. Not possession at the exclusion of the other occupants of the 
house , but possession nonetheless. 
The B.C. Court of Appeal agreed with this verdict , and consequently, 
The Accused's Appeal was Dismissed. 
Conviction of "Possession" was Upheld. 
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ASSAULT RESULTING Ill BODILY HARM 
INTENT TO CAUSE BODILY HARM 
Regina v. BRDOKS - B.C. Court of Appeal -
CA 007016 - March 1988 
Mr. C and his family were headed home on B.C. ' s lower mainland. They had 
been on vacation in California in their motorhome. It was around midnight 
when they were passed by a jeep with three young people in it. The accused 
was the driver. Mr. C dimmed his headlights when the jeep got in front of 
him, and put his lights back on high beam when he felt there was sufficient 
distance between him and the jeep. Apparently the accused did not think the 
distance was sufficient and stopped. As the motorhome tried to pass the jeep 
in the lane for opposing traffic, the accused stayed along side the motorhome 
and prevented it from returning to the right hand lane. The accused drove 
aggressively and apparently bumped the right rear bumper of the motor home. 
He then forced the motorhome to stop, opened the driver's door and pulled 
Mr. C out of the cab. With this, an oncoming car struck both the accused and 
Mr. C. Both were injured; Mr. C more seriously than the accused. 
The accused was convicted of assault causing bodily harm and appealed this 
conviction. It seems fair to say that the grounds for appeal conceded the 
assault, but challenged that the Crown had proved that the accused intended or 
had any objective foreseeability* that bodily harm would result. He, like 
Vaillencourt, claimed that the consequences of the criminal offence committed 
must have been at least objectively foreseeable for them to be included in the 
crime of which he may consequently be convicted. The unintentional accident 
the accused caused, caused the bodily harm. To be convicted of the accidental 
consequence of an offence, rather than of what was intended, is contrary to 
the principles of fundamental justice. Hence his rights under s. 7 of the 
Charter not to be deprived of his liberty or security of his person other than 
by a process that applies those principles, was infringed argued defence 
counsel. 
The B.C. Court of Appeal firstly reviewed the distinctions between this case 
and the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Vaillencourt. The intent required 
for murder is a reprehensible one and the consequence (death) is the most 
severe, one human can cause the other. It was for that very reason why the 
"specific mens rea prerequisite" principle was so stringently applied to the 
homicide provision in s. 213 C.C. 
Conversely, assault is far less severe and in terms of intent not as #highly 
reprehensible". Furthermore, bodily harm can range from the most minimal harm 
to the most serious. And our common law has always recognized that "the 
consequences of an unlawful act may affect the degree of culpability". A good 
example is the distinction the law provides between attempting to commit an 
* See R. v. Vaillencourt - Volume 30, page 1 of this publication . 
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offence and committing the full offence . In nearly all cases the failure was 
not due to a lack of intent and from at least a moral point of view, both 
ought to be equally blameworthy. 
In respect to the question if foreseeability of the bodily harm is essential 
before it can be included in what was intended, the Court reminded counsel for 
the defence of its decision in 1977 when the identical question was put to 
this Court .* Said the Court in 1977: 
* 
" ... here there is no question that the appellant committed 
the assault, had the intention to commit the assault and 
that it caused bodily harm. In my view, all the elements 
of the offence are thereby made out." 
Appeal Dismissed. 
Conviction Upheld. 
R. v. Har~ell. B.C.C.A . November 25 , 1977, CA 760977. 
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•INVASION OF PRIVACY IAllS• 
DOES AN ACCUSED HAVE ACCESS AS A llATrF.R. OF RIGHT 
TO THE CONTENTS OF THE SEALED PACKET? (s. 178.14(1) C.C.) 
Regina v. DERSCH et al - 36 C.C.C. (3d) 435 
B.C. Court of Appeal 
The accused were charged with various drug offenses and the Crown relied 
heavily on evidence obtained by means of authorized wiretaps. For the 
preliminary hearing the accused applied for access to the packet containing 
the documents and information which supported the applications for the 
authorizations. They claimed to have, despite the language of the Invasion of 
Privacy sections in the Criminal Code, access to the package as a matter of 
right. Their only claim was that they had to be tried by the principles of 
fundamental justice (s. 7 Charter) which includes access to all information in 
the armour of the Crown to make a full answer and defence. 
They were successful. The County Court Judge did not want to add anymore to 
the abundance of literature on this issue and simply ordered the Crown to 
assist in editing the material to protect informers. By using the word 
"literature" he referred undoubtedly to the numerous cases across Canada that 
have this issue on center-stage. Most cases are decided favoring the 
application for full disclosure. The Crown took the matter to the B.C. 
Supreme Court and was successful in having the County Court decision reversed. 
The accused in turn appealed to the B.C. Court of Appeal. 
The highest court in B.C. observed that the Invasion of Privacy provisions in 
the Criminal Code includes an exclusionary provision much more stringent than 
that under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The defence strategies now are 
to gain access to the package by means of the Charter and then use the strict 
exclusionary rule contained in the Invasion of Privacy provisions of the 
Criminal Code. If you can find any flaw in the documentation the interception 
~ be declared unlawful and the evidence obtained thereby shall be excluded. 
There is no consideration for circumstances, gravity of the offence or whether 
exclusion (or admission for that matter) would bring disrepute on the 
administration of justice. The Court seemed to imply that there is a 
dichotomy in our law in that the Charter's exclusionary rule is conditional 
and that contained in ordinary law is absolute. It implied also that despite 
the apparent principled reasons that have persuaded members of the judiciary 
to disclose the edited version of the package contents to the defence is in 
essence no more than issuing a fishing licence (these are not the court's 
words). The tenor of the B.C. Court of Appeal judgement on this point is: 
"The broad issue is whether an accused person .... is 
entitled as of right to have access to the contents of the 
sealed packet in order to explore the possibility of 
turning up some ground for attacking the validity of the 
authorization, and thus rendering inadmissible the 
evidence obtained under it." Further down it added, 
" ... in the hope that the Crown will not be able to prove 
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its case and that an acquittal will follow. If the law 
provides that avenue to acquittal, the accused is 
entitled to take advantage of it." 
The Court said in the same breath. that where the grounds of exclusion of 
evidence is not connected with the issue of 1uilt or innocence there is no 
constitutional protection. The Charter, (used to gain access to the packet) 
must not be used to broaden that route to acquittal held the B.C. Court of 
Appeal. What defence counsel is looking for is some procedural error in the 
way the authorization was issued which is unrelated to the question whether 
the accused is able to make a full answer and defence. Therefore refusal of 
access to the packet's content does not necessarily affect the right to defend 
oneself and is consequently not always a constitutionally protected right. If 
an accused person can show that the authorization was fraudulently obtained, 
that there was deliberate non-disclosure in relation to the application, or 
where it can be shown that the package may contain information that directly, 
may at least create a reasonable doubt about his guilt (rather than some 
technical reason for excluding the evidence) then he does have a 
constitutional right (s. 7 Charter) to access. 
The Court said that opening the packet was also justified for an innocent 
person to seek redress for the invasion of his privacy, particularly if 
interceptions of his communication did not reveal or support any criminal 
activities on his part. However, where the intercepted communications 
indicate involvement in serious crime there are simply no grounds for access 
to the packet contents for "unjustified breach". 
Accused's Appeal Dismissed. 
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RIGHT TO COUNSEL - PRIVACY 
Regina v. STAlf.DISH - B. C. Court of Appeal -
Vancouver - 007851 - March 1988 
The accused was arrested and demanded to give samples of his breath. In a 
rather large "booking room" the accused was given an opportunity to seek 
counsel. Although one constable stayed in the room with the accused there was 
no evidence that he was within earshot. The accused's efforts were indeed of 
a "seeking" nature as no lawyer answered the phone in the middle of the night . 
The accused left a message on an answering machine and did, after complaining 
of the futility of calling lawyers, give the breath samples without any 
objection. 
The trial judge held that the accused's rights to counsel had been infringed 
by the presence of the constable in that the accused did not have complete 
privacy. The fact that no conversation with any lawyer took place was 
irrelevant he held. The right to counsel is absolute, and privacy is part of 
that right, "in the full sense of the word, that is; privacy from square 
one." A County Court Judge agreed with the trial judge and dismissed the 
Crown's appeal of the acquittal. 
The B.C. Court of Appeal held that both judges were in error. Said the Court: 
"The right to privacy established under the Charter does 
not necessarily start by the attempt to reach a lawyer. 
It starts after the accused reaches his lawyer and seeks 
his advice." 
The Court of Appeal added that the right to consultation in private is 
tempered by what circumstances permit. It seems that the Court here 
predominantly referred to privacy in as far as sight is concerned. 
The Court concluded that there was no evidence of an infringement of the 
accused's right to privacy. 
Crown's Appeal Allowed . 
New Trial Ordered. 
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IS •I VAS SCARED" SUFFICIENT TO REBUT PRESUMPTION 
OF INTENT IN AN ALLEGATION OF HIT AND RUN? 
Regina v. BRAIJTIGAlf - B.C. Court of Appeal -
February 1988 - Vancouver CA 003800 
The accused "who was not intoxicated" drove on a main road under normal 
daylight road conditions. He left his lane and went on the paved shoulder of 
the road knocking a teenaged boy off his bicycle. The boy died instantly. 
The accused's windshield was smashed, but he nonetheless, did not even brake 
but accelerated, leaving the scene of the accident. Due to alert witnesses, 
police apprehended the accused five miles from the scene of the accident. 
Only after being placed under arrest for hit and run did the accused refer to 
the incident. He simply said that he would have reported the accident when he 
got home and: "I realized I should have stopped right away then, but I guess 
I was scared". 
The law states that failing to stop, offer assistance and identifying oneself 
is in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, proof of intent to escape 
criminal or civil liability (s. 233(2) C.C.). The accused was convicted in 
Provincial Court for leaving the scene with the intent to escape such 
liability. 
The accused appealed his conviction to the B.C. Court of Appeal submitting 
that his claim to being scared was sufficient to be "the evidence to the 
contrary" to create at least, a reasonable doubt as to the intent that is an 
essential component of the offence charged. 
In a nearly identical case,* the person charged had testified how he had 
panicked and was reasonably sure that the cyclist he hit was dead. He could 
not cope with seeing the dead body or the consequences of the accident. The 
totality of that evidence had been sufficient to displace the presumption of 
the criminal intent referred to in s. 233(2) C.C, As the Crown had solely 
relied on the presumption created by that subsection, to prove intent, it 
apparently fell short of proving its case . 
All the accused Brautigam placed before the courts was his statement upon 
arrest: "I was scared I guess." There was no reason given indicating what he 
was scared of. Although fright may cause a person to leave the scene in such 
circumstances for reasons other than to escape civil or criminal liability, it 
could hardly be said that the accused presented "any evidence to the contrary" 
that he left for any reason but to escape such liabilities. 
* R. v. Emery 61 C.C.C. (2d) p. 84. 
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Said the Court: 
"Being scared describes a man's reaction to the events but 
does not disclose why he flees .... The expression 'I was 
scared ' is not by itself evidence of a lack of intent to 
escape civil or criminal liability." 
Accused's Appeal Dismissed. 
Conviction for ' Hit and Run' Upheld. 
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CONSENSUAL FISTFIGHT RESULTING IN DEATII 
KF.ANING OF CONSENT -- CR.IKINAL LIABILITY 
Regina v. JOBIDON - 36 C.C.C. ( 3d) 340 -
Ontario High Court of Justice. 
A 25 year old Mr. H was to marry on September 19, 1986. Instead he died on 
that day due to a senseless but crowd pleasing fist fight during the "stag" 
party laid on by his friends two days before. The deceased and his party 
attended a pub and watched a strip show. The discussion among the parties was 
related to one of their nwnber having been the recipient of a "sucker punch" 
(an out-of-the-blue unexpected punch) from the accused or one of his brothers. 
The groom-to-be, who was bigger and heavier than the accused, approached the 
table of the accused and his party. While standing so close to the accused 
that he was unable to get up, Mr. H asked, "Is your name Jobidon." When this 
was confirmed Mr. H invited the accused to step outside, apparently to avenge 
the aforementioned sucker punch. The accused pushed Mr. H back and the result 
was a rolling on the floor during which punches were exchanged. The accused 
obviously lost that contest and sustained a cut lip and bruises. Angry verbal 
exchanges left everyone with the impression that this was not the end and that 
the protagonists would meet again at the first conceivable opportunity. 
Due to the fight the accused and his brother were asked to leave the pub. 
While waiting in the parking lot for a ride (according to them) Mr. Hand the 
"bridal party" came out. The accused mustered all his strength in a punch he 
delivered to the head of Mr. H who was apparently still working on the prelude 
of the inevitable fight, such as exchanging insults and invitations to this 
contest. The accused had, during this verbal exchange, lunged forward and 
delivered that blow to the head of Mr. H which caused him to sag to the 
ground. The accused followed through with a series of punches to H's head 
which limblessly bopped from side to side. Some bystanders grabbed the 
accused and tried to pull him away from H, who was obviously no longer a 
contestant but a victim. However, the bloodthirsty crowd would not have any 
part of this and threatened the peace makers. Many witness spectators 
protested the "break-up" by shouting that it was a "fair fight". The accused 
was let go and a few more severe blows were delivered to the limbless head. 
Mr. H was in a coma for a day and died in the early hours of his wedding day. 
The accused was charged with second degree murder which was reduced to 
manslaughter by the provincial court judge who conducted the preliminary 
inquiry. The indictment alleged that he had "unlawfully" killed Mr. H, and 
he was tried by a justice of the Ontario High Court of Justice, without jury. 
The defence was on the controversial issue of consent. Based on the evidence 
the Court found in terms of mutual intent: 
" .... It was a fight in anger, and no friendly sparring 
contest or test of strength. The object of the fight was 
to hit the other man as hard as physically possible until 
he gave up or retreated. Physical injury was intended and 
contemplated . . .. The accused intentionally hit Rodney 
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Hoggart as hard as he could. He believed he was fighting 
fair, and he did not intentionally depart from the kind of 
fight that Mr. Hoggart consented to .... " 
In short, the accused claimed that he was involved in a consensual, but fatal 
fist fight. In view of that consent he did not assault H nor was he 
criminally negligent as the indictment implied by alleging that he 
"unlawfully" killed H. The evidence had not revealed which of the punches 
caused the severe brain damage that caused H's death. 
The law in Canada is not consistent. In some provinces one can consent to 
having bodily harm inflicted on him which then rebuts any evidence of 
criminal intent on the part of the person who inflected that harm. In other 
provinces the courts have prudently placed a limitation of what one can 
consent to. Bodily harm, for instance, cannot be consented to, and consent is 
limited to a fair contest and not combat. Such fair contest, like ballroom 
dancing and requires two willing partners which, except where it creates a 
disturbance in a public place, is not an offence. However, where one of the 
partners is no longer capable and renders the contest unbalanced and unfair to 
him, then consent can no longer be assumed. Then the contest stops and the 
assault begins. Our consent is simply not unlimited and, for instance, a dual 
or a fight to the death is not considered suitable for a defence of consent. 
Even in our gladiatorial sports, consent has been limited by the courts. 
In this case the trial judge found that the accused did not intend the death 
of the victim, or that he intended to cause him bodily harm. He found the 
loud judgement of the spectators who classified the fight fair, to be 
significant in terms of the accused's mental element that meets the RES GESTAE 
test. It was so closely connected to the events in question that it became 
part of it. The crowd, the accused, and even the "peace corps" found 
confirmation in the outcry "it's a fair fight" and that the assessment was 
reasonable if not accurate. 
Furthermore, the medical evidence was insufficient to say what blow or 
combination of blows did cause the death. Reasoned the court: 
"Thus if any of the blows were lawful, the Crown has not 
established that the accused unlawfully caused the death." 
It is obvious that the court reasoned that if the first blow was a lawful one 
and the subsequent ones to the limbless body unlawful, the Crown must prove 
that it was the first one that killed Mr. H. Apparently the pathologist could 
not say. 
Concluding that the Crown failed also to show that the accused went beyond the 
scope of the consent Mr. H implied .... 
The Accused was Acquitted. 
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Comment: 
Hopefully , our Supreme Court of Canada will not reason similarly when this or 
another like case comes before them. They are more likely to follow the 
highest court in England and the different views now established in some of 
our provinces. 
Another matter that seems to flaw this case is the court's description of the 
fight in terms of what was intended (quoted above) and the conclusion 
(underlined above) that the accused did not intend to cause H bodily harm. 
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POUCE OFFICER SPEAKING TO •susp1c1ous• PEDES'l"RIAH 
INFRINGEMENT OF RIGHT TO LIBERTY AND SECURITY 
R. v. GRAFFE - Ontario Court of Appeal -
36 c.c.c. (3d) 267. 
Two police constables in a police car noticed two young pedestrians paying 
unusual attention to them. Both considered this suspicious. They stopped and 
according to the youths they were called to the cruiser while the officers 
recollected yelling out of the car to check them. They were asked for their 
names. The accused gave his brother's name as there was an outstanding fine 
for trespassing for him. Later the officers discovered the impersonation and 
arrested the accused who confessed. He was acquitted of impersonation nwith 
intent to gain advantage for himself to wit: avoid being arrested on a 
committal warrant.n The Ontario Court of Appeal reviewed the Crown's appeal. 
The defence claimed and the officers conceded that they had nothing on the 
pedestrians they were suspicious of and had they failed to identify themselves 
there was little they could have done. Furthermore the pedestrians were 
detained when called over and there had been no informing of rights to 
counsel. The Ontario Court of Appeal found that in the circumstances there 
had been no interference with liberty or security of the person. Said the 
Court: 
"The law has long recognized that although there is no 
legal duty there is a moral or social duty on the part of 
every citizen to answer questions put to him or her by the 
police and, in that way assist police .... Implicit in that 
moral or social duty is the right of a police officer to 
ask questions even, in my opinion, when he or she has no 
belief that an offence has been committed. To be asked 
questions, in these circumstances, cannot be said to be a 
deprivation of liberty or security." 
Whether or not there was detention, the Court concluded that there was no 
simple way to determine that. 
"The criteria to which courts have referred include demand 
or direction as opposed to request, language used and tone 
of voice, compulsion including psychological compulsion 
and, it seems to me, place of contact." 
The accused and his companion conceded that the request for their identity was 
polite, but that they nonetheless had felt there was compulsion to answer the 
questions. 
The Court of Appeal rejected the defence submissions. The conversation 
resulted from a polite invitation in broad daylight on the sidewalk of a busy 
street. They were not asked to sit in the cruiser and the conversation was 
very short. Concluding that the Charter does not intend to insulate the 
public from all contact, including trivial contact , with authorities. The 
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contact in this case was innocuous; there was no infringement of a right and 
no evidence should have been excluded (as the trial judge did). 
Crown Appeal Allowed. 
Acquittal Set Aside. 
Trial to be Continued. 
The Court only dealt with the admissibility of the evidence and concluded that 
the trial must continue with all the evidence admitted. It did not say that 
impersonation in these circumstances is a criminal act. 
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PROHIBITED WEAPON AND DEFINITION OF WEAPON 
Regina v. COLE'/fAN - 37 C.C.C. (3d) 568 
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench 
Police, investigating "a matter" entered a trailer and found the accused 
sleeping in a bedroom. He had nothing to do with the matter police were 
investigating and the encounter was a coincidence. The accused was 
(apparently in plain view) in possession of two sticks connected by a chain. 
The Crown alleged this to be a "nunchaku" which is listed as a prohibited 
weapon. He was charged accordingly and was acquitted in Provincial Court. 
The Crown appealed. 
The legal issue involved in this appeal is the application of the 1985 
amendment of the definition of "weapon" to the provisions prohibiting and 
restricting possession of certain weapons. 
The definition of weapon was amended 
"Offensive weapon" or "weapon" means 
(a) anything that is designed to be used as a weapon, .QX 
(b) anything that a person uses or intends to use as a weapon, whether 
or not it is designed to be used as a weapon, and 
without restricting the generality of the foregoing, includes any firearm 
as defined in section 82. 
"Weapon" means 
(a) anything used or intended for use in causing death or injury to 
persons whether designed for such purpose or not, or 
(b) anything used or intended for use for the purpose of threatening or 
intimidating any person, and 
without restricting the generality of the foregoing , includes any firearm 
as defined in section 82. 
The accused had not used the weapon nor was there any evidence he intended to 
do so. It had been held at trial that simply having a thing of certain 
description listed as a prohibited weapon is insufficient to hold that the 
thing is "a weapon". 
It seems that the new definition is designed to make it solely subjective in 
its application. In other words nothing is a weapon unless it is intended to 
- 34 -
be used as one. The removal of nanything that is designed to be used as a 
·weapon" from the definition caused the accused not to be captured by the law 
as it now is according to the Provincial Court trial judge. Simply put, 
nothing except a firearm, is a weapon unless the possessor intends to use it 
as such. The objective test, whether or not the object was designed to be 
used as a weapon, seems to have been removed. 
The Justice of the Court of the Queen's Bench was not prepared to be as 
restrictive in the interpretation of the new law. He felt that Parliament had 
left some measure of objectivity in the definition. He held that the words 
"anything used ... for causing death or injury to persons" has the connotation 
of "anything used by anyone" for such purpose; only the words "anything 
intended for use" indicate subjectivity on the part of the possessor (what did 
he intend to do with it?). In short, disjunctive or alternative objective and 
subjective tests are all provided in subsection (a) of the new definition 
where in the old definition they were in subsection (a) and (b) respectively. 
The nunchaku sticks clearly fall within the objective test the definition 
provides for .... "You possess them; they are a weapon as they have simply no 
other purpose and are used by anyone else as a weapon; they are listed as a 
prohibited weapon; the offence is complete." 
Crown's Appeal Allowed . 
New Trial Ordered. 
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POLICE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AND THE CHARTER 
l . BURNHAlf v. Ackroyd et: al -
2. TRIJHBLEY AND PUGH v. Het:ropolit:an Toront:o Police Force -
3. TRIHH v. Durham Regional Police Force -
37 C.C.C. (3d) 115 - 118 and 120 respectively - Supreme Court of Canada 
1. Mr. Burnham, who was at all material times a member of the Toronto 
Police, allegedly made a false complaint against a fellow member and was 
absent from duty without leave. 
2. Trumbley and Pugh, members of the Toronto Police allegedly had sexual 
intercourse with a woman in a police car. 
3. Trimm, a member of the Durham Regional Police left his assigned patrol 
area and thereby neglected his duties and refused to obey a lawful order. 
These personnel were charged with relevant disciplinary defaults under the 
Code of Offenses included in the Ontario Police Act. As they appeared before 
designated officers to be tried for the alleged defaults, they took objection 
to the proceedings. It was claimed that their rights under s. ll(d) Charter 
were infringed as a trial presided over by a superior officer is not a fair or 
impartial trial. They unsuccessfully sought orders of prohibition against the 
presiding officers and also failed with their Charter arguments in the Ontario 
Court of Appeal. Finally they took their plight to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. 
In all the cases it was argued and recognized that in terms of consequences 
the sentences resulting from a disciplinary process may be far more 
devastating than those resulting from a criminal trial. Reprimands and 
suspensions could affect promotional opportunities and in that way be a 
financial loss and also socially embarrassing. Dismissals need hardly to be 
explored as to loss of income and career. 
Our highest court, however, held that s. 11 of the Charter refers to rights of 
persons charged with an offence which means a violation of law prosecuted in a 
criminal or penal proceeding which involves true penal consequences like 
public fines and imprisonment. Police disciplinary proceedings despite being 
created by statute are nonetheless administrative and internal in nature and 
its consequences are civil and not criminal in character. Although the 
process may be more formal than normal, it is in the realm of employer-
employee relationships. Even dismissal is not to deter or reform, but to rid 
the employer of the burden of an employee who has shown to be unfit. 
Consequently the provisions of s. 11 of the Charter do not apply to Police 
disciplinary proceedings under the Ontario Police Act. 
Appeal Dismissed. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada shortly afterward (Nov. 1987) considered the 
appeal by Cst. Wigglesworth of the R.C.M.P. (WIGGLESWORTH v. The Queen, 37 
c.c.c. (3d) 385). 
Cst. W had grabbed and slapped a suspected impaired driver until he admitted 
that he, rather than his sister, was the driver of the car involved in an 
accident. He was convicted under the R.C.M.P. Act with cruel or unnecessary 
violence to a person by a disciplinary court and was then also convicted of 
assault in the public court system. He appealed arguing that his rights 
under s. 11 of the Charter had been infringed. He apparently did not 
challenge the impartiality of the discipline court but claimed that his right 
to be convicted only once of an offence arising from one action (s. ll(h) 
Charter) had been infringed. This had been rejected by the courts in the 
province of Saskatchewan. Consequently he was assessed $300.00 by the 
discipline court and fined $250.00 in the public court system. 
The question whether all procedures that have penal consequences are covered 
by s. 11 Charter has received the narrow and broad approach. Some courts 
have included all procedures that may have adverse consequences to an 
individual while other courts have taken the narrow view that only where a 
person is charged in a public court of record does s. 11 of the Charter apply. 
As can be seen in the cases under the Ontario Police Act the Supreme Court of 
Canada takes the latter view, and reiterated that in this case. The broad 
approach would make s. 11 of the Charter available in proceedings for which 
the guarantees were not meant; in other words the broader approach would abuse 
the purpose of the guarantees. Basically an offence (s. 11 Charter only 
applies where a person is charged with an offence) is a public offence where a 
person is prosecuted by the state and where there are punitive sanctions if 
convicted. The tenor of s. 11 clearly indicates that the narrow approach was 
intended and applies to offenses created to promote public order "and welfare 
within the public sphere of activity." It does not apply to "private, 
domestic or disciplinary matters which are regulatory, private, protective or 
corrective" designed to maintain professional integrity , ethics and 
discipline in a limited more private sphere. 
However, the Supreme court of Canada did not completely close the door to the 
application of s. 11 of the Charter in private proceedings, where they 
involve "the imposition of true penal consequences." The constable in this 
case was charged with a "major service offence" enacted by Parliament with a 
maximum penalty of one year imprisonment. That is a true criminal 
consequence as would "a fine which by its magnitude would appear to be imposed 
for the purpose of redressing the wrong done to society at large .... " Because 
of the penalty of imprisonment for one year, s. 11 of the Charter does apply 
to major service offenses under the R.C.M. Police Act. Consequently, the 
matter of double jeopardy needed to be addressed. Or to put it in other 
words, the true penal consequences of a major disciplinary default under the 
R.C.M.P. Act make such a default an offence included in s. 11 of the Charter. 
Despite the R.C.M.P. constable having the constitutional guarantee not to be 
convicted more than once for one act of assault, the criminal and private 
procedures created two distinct offenses ( the Criminal Code of Canada and the 
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R.C.M.P. Act). Disciplinary offenses are separate and distinct from criminal 
offenses for the purpose of multiple convictions held the Court. The one 
process is for him to answer to his profession the other to the public. 
The Constable ' s Appeal was Dismissed. 
As no period of incarceration was imposed the constitutionality of a provision 
for a jail sentence in a private and internal scheme of law had to be left 
unchallenged. 
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•OUTBURST• STATEMENT MADE BY ACCUSED DURING HIS TRIAL - ADMISSIBILITY 
Regina v. LAKES - B.C . Supreme Court -
Vancouver C.C. 870976 - April 1988 
The accused was being tried for murder before a jury. Yhen a police officer 
was giving his evidence-in-chief the accused burst out that he was 
brainwashed by police to believe that he killed his friend. He then said: "I 
dld not kill him." The question was what the trial judge should instruct the 
jury to do with that statement. Needless to say the statement was unsworn and 
not testimony. No cross examination was possible unless the accused would 
take the stand and repeat his allegation of brainwashing and his claim of 
innocence. 
The Supreme Court Justice who had been unable to silence the accused had 
adjourned the court in the middle of the accused's outburst, and he had to 
tell the jury what weight if any, to attach to the statement. 
Since the statement was not testimony, the court considered it similar to 
other statements which are all at the discretion of the Crown whether to 
adduce them into evidence. In this case it was exclusively up to the Crown to 
say whether it wanted the statement to be considered as evidence. Such 
application was not made and therefore the jury was instructed not to consider 
the statement in their deliberations . 
One wonders what the Court would have to do if the statement was inculpatory ; 
for instance, an outburst of repentance and confession. If evidence of a 
statement of this kind inadvertantly came before a jury via a witness, a 
finding of a mistrial may result . 
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USE OF INTERCEP'rED COMMUNICATION VHEllE 
ACCQSED IS NOT THE ORIGINATOR OR RECEIVER. 
Regina v. NYGAARD and SCHIHHENS - 36 C.C.C. (3d) 199 -
Alberta Court of Appeal 
The two accused had clubbed a person to death who had issued a bad cheque to 
one of them. There· was $100.00 involved. While in the process of collecting 
anyway, they had also taken all the money three visitors in the house of the 
victim had in their possession. 
At their trial for murder, the accused called a witness to give evidence that 
favoured them. This defence witness had a telephone conversation with a Crown 
Witness, in which she had contradicted her testimony. Crown counsel had a 
transcript of this conversation and cross-examined the defence witness on the 
contradiction, without any proof that the interception of the communication 
was authorized and lawful. The trial judge had allowed this but had carefully 
explained to the jury that the evidence of contradiction could only be used 
for them. to determine her credibility and the truthfulness of her testimony. 
They could not use the evidence of the intercepted communication as proof of 
its content. 
The accused, when appealing their murder conviction, argued that the trial 
judge erred in allowing the cross-examination without proof of the lawfulness 
of the interception and that the jury should have been made aware that the 
prior statements made by the defence witness were part of an intercepted 
private telephone conversation. 
The Alberta Court of Appeal ruled that the exclusionary rule in s.178.16 C. C. 
had no application as the evidence of the contradiction was not adduced 
against the originator or the intended receiver of the intercepted 
communication. It also held that a prior inconsistent statement made by a 
witness in circumstances as in this case must be ·treated as any other such 
statement. 
Comment: 
Grounds of Appeal with Respect to the 
Cross-examination Failed. 
No attempt was made to have the evidence by means of cross-examination 
excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter. Unlawful interception is an offence 
and may well infringe a right under s.7 and/or 8 of the Charter. The evidence 
of the inconsistent statement could be argued to have probative value against 
the accused. In other words, the evidence did more than discredit the 
witness. The inferences a jury may draw from the production of apparently 
perjurious defence evidence can be very detrimental to the accused. Should 
the Court find that the interception was a search then according to the 
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precedent set by the Supreme Court of Canada in October 1984* , the onus is on 
the Crown to show it was a reasonable search. In this case one could submit 
that the search was warrantless, which according to the Supreme Court of 
Canada is an unreasonable search unless the Crown shows that it was 
reasonable. If the interception was lawfully done upon judicial 
authorization it is likely also reasonable. 
For instance, if one can persuade the Court that the interception was an 
infringement of the right to security of the person, then the onus is on the 
accused to show, on the balance of probabilities, that such an infringement 
occurred.** This then could have opened the door to consideration for 
suppression of the evidence of inconsistent statements under s.24(2) of the 
Charter. 
There are some other evidentiary hurdles defence counsel may have to overcome , 
but it seems a defence argument that is not too far fetched, but was not tried 
in this case. 
* Bunter v. Southam Inc. - Volume 18, page 12 of this publication. 
**Collins v. The Queen - Volume 27, page 1 of this publication. 
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ADMISSIBILITY OF STATFJIENT 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL - DID ACCUSED UNDERSTAND 
Baig v. The Queen - 37 C.C.C. ( 3d) 181 
Supreme Court of Canada 
Police investigated a murder and arrested the accused at his home. He was 
immediately told of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. When 
asked if he understood the warning and the advice the accused replied: "How 
can you prove this thing?n As soon as they arrived at the police building the 
accused was told that three other persons had been arrested as well " ... and we 
know exactly what happened, so you might as well tell us about it." The 
accused had replied: "Okay, okay, I'll tell you." Before the accused did 
tell he was asked if he had understood the "caution" he had been given. He 
had replied: "Yes, I know." Then a standard form was used for the recording 
of the statement. It was read out to the accused and he answered "Yes" to the 
questions if he: (1) understood the charge; (2) knew he had a right to remain 
silent; and (3) had been advised of and understood his right to counsel. He 
had also signed his statement on that form. 
The trial judge had suppressed the statement under s.24(2) of the Charter in 
that the accused's right to counsel had been violated. Without the statement 
the Crown had no case and the jury was directed to return a verdict of not 
guilty. Apparently the trial judge was of the opinion that the officers had 
not gone far enough in the matter of the accused consulting a lawyer before he 
incriminated himself in this most serious criminal allegation. In other 
words, what had happened did not amount to a waiver of the accused's right to 
counsel. The Crown appealed and the Ontario Court of Appeal ordered a new 
trial. The accused, in turn, appealed that decision to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. 
The Supreme Court of Canada held that in the absence of an indication that an 
accused person may not have understood the right to retain and instruct 
counsel without delay, at the time he was advised of that right, it must be 
assumed that the advice was understood. Unless, of course, the accused shows 
"that he asked for the right but it was denied or he was denied an 
opportunity to even ask for it. " 
The accused had not shown such apprehension or lack of opportunity , neither 
does the evidence suggest that there was any hinderance had he wanted to 
exercise his right to counsel. Said the Court: 
"Absent such circumstances, .... once the police have 
complied with s.lO(b), by advising the accused without 
delay of his right to counsel without delay, there are no 
correlative duties triggered and cast upon them until the 
accused, if he so chooses, has indicated his desire to 
exercise his right to counsel". 
Accused's Appeal Dismissed. 
Order for a New Trial Upheld. 
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RIGHT TO COUNSEL - IMPAIRED DRIVING AND 
REFUSAL BY PERSON VER.Y FAMILIAR VITH PROCESS 
Regina v. LAYNE - County Court of Vancouver -
CC870406 - Vancouver Registry - March 1988. 
Police officers had followed a car that had emerged from a pub parking lot . 
It had a near collision and did some "drifting". Just as enough had been 
enough and the equipment to stop the driver was to be activated, the car 
stopped near a store and the driver went into the building. He was then 
recognized by the officers as a defence lawyer regularly seen in the courts. 
The accused was showing definite symptoms of impairment. He demanded to 
examine the officers' notes and tried to advise them what to include in them. 
The accused was arrested, given all the warnings and advice he was entitled to 
and was then read a demand for samples of his breath. At the police station 
the accused availed himself of a phone and then demanded the use of another 
phone. With a quarter from the officers he then made a lengthy call in 
private, but while being observed. After 20 minutes of this the accused was 
told to "Wrap it up". Ten minutes later the request was repeated to which a 
simple "no" was the response. The officers then hung up for the accused and 
escorted him to the breathalyzer where he refused to give any samples until he 
had spoken to a lawyer. 
In his defence the accused called friends to testify that he was not impaired 
that evening. The person on duty at his answering service testified how the 
accused had asked her the phone number of a certain lawyer and had been cut 
off before she could give it to him. The accused claimed that all his other 
telephone conversation had been with a lawyer who was the accused's employee. 
For his "drifting" and erratic driving he led evidence of mechanical steering 
problems. 
The trial judge had considered the defence witnesses to be unreliable and had 
failed to consider evidence of the bumpy road the accused travelled. 
Furthermore, he had found the police conduct during the investigation 
appropriate. Consequently the accused was convicted of impaired driving and 
failure to comply with a demand for breath samples. 
The accused appealed and argued that the trial judge had found he was impaired 
on a balance of probabilities instead of beyond a reasonable doubt. Secondly 
he argued that the officer who made the demand had done so based on suspicion 
of impairment rather than the requisite belief based on reasonable and 
probable grounds. In answer to a question about his opinion of the accused's 
condition when he made the demand, the officer had responded: "I suspected 
that he had committed an offence under section .... due to the consumption of 
alcohol and that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was, in fact, impaired 
by that alcohol". Thirdly the accused claimed that he was not given a 
reasonable opportunity to retain and instruct counsel. All he had was five 
minutes with a legal associate and was cut off when he attempted to make 
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contact with the counsel of his choice. 
The County Court judge rejected all of the grounds of appeal. The evidence of 
the officer (despite the unfortunate referral to a "suspicion" due to the "in 
fact"), was sufficient to prove that he had the prerequisite grounds to make 
the demand. The trial judge had given adequate and careful consideration to 
the defence evidence and he gave reason for not considering the evidence of 
the friends of the accused to be reliable. In regards to the infringement of 
right to counsel the County Court judge found that the accused had been given 
a reasonable opportunity to exercise his right and did speak with a legal 
associate. Therefore the police interruption after 30 minutes of private 
conversations and use of a telephone made the Court observe: •In the absence 
of any enlightenment from Mr. Layne, it appears he had already had a 
reasonable opportunity to do so". 
Appeals were Dismissed. 
Conviction for Impaired Driving and 
Refusal to Supply a Breath Sample are 
Dismissed. 
CORRECTION NOTICE 
Issues of Is~erest Volume 31. "RIGHT TO COUNSEL - IMPAIRED DRIVING AND 
REFUSAL BY PERSON VERY FAMILIAR WITH PROCESS". Regina v. IAYNE - County 
Court of Vancouver - CC870406 - Vancouver Registry - March 1988. 
Page 43. 
Please note the following correction: 
Appeals were Dismissed. 
Convictions for Impaired Driving and 
Refusal to Supply a Breath Sample were Upheld. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF B.C.'S 24 HOUR 
ROADSIDE DRIVER'S LICENSE SUSPENSIONS 
The Queen and SENGARA - B.C. Supreme Court -
Vancouver CC871899 - May 3, 1988 
Based upon good grounds for believing that a Mr. Sengara's ability to drive 
was affected by the consumption of alcohol, his driver's license was suspended 
for a period of 24 hours under provisions of s.214 of the B.C. Motor Vehicle 
Act. Mr. S was served and did sign a notice of the suspension. Within an 
hour Mr. S was found driving his car. In Provincial Court the Motor Vehicle 
Act offence of driving in such circumstances was dismissed as the trial judge 
held that the section of this act violates s.7 of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. He declared the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act to be 
without force or effect due to them violating constitutional rights of 
motorists. The Crown took this matter by means of "stated case" to the B.C. 
Supreme Court. 
A few years ago* a Mr. Robson took his plight under this section of the B.C. 
Motor Vehicle Act to the B.C. Court of Appeal. He took issue with the grounds 
officers bad to have to deprive him of his Charter right to drive a motor 
vehicle, which according to s.7 of the Charter can only be taken away from him 
by a process based on the principles of fundamental justice. A peace officer 
who has reason to suspect that a motorist has consumed alcohol (no matter 
when, or if it had affected him in any way) was hardly such a process reasoned 
Mr. Robson. The B.C. Court of Appeal agreed and declared the 24 hour 
suspension laws invalid. 
The B.C. Government responded by relegislating the provisions for suspension 
of drivers' licenses by police of drinking drivers but changed the offending 
part of it. The new prerequisite in effect when Mr. Sengara was suspended, is 
that a peace officer must have reasonable and probable grounds to believe that 
the driver's ability to drive is affected by alcohol. This change was 
obviously not sufficient in the view of the Provincial Court..JE.d~ to have 
remedied the constitutional shortcomings of this 24 hour roadside suspension. 
Some of the reasons for so finding is that the section does not require the 
notice to the motorist to include a description of his affected performance 
behind the wheel, nor is there any independent hearing to determine if the 
officer's beliefs are justified and appropriately founded. Another 
interesting objection taken with these suspension provisions is the lack of 
discretion on the part of the peace officer to limit the period of suspension 
to the degree of impairment. For instance, a 24 hour suspension for a person 
who will no longer suffer the affects of alcohol in a couple of hours is 
excessive. In other words the imposition must be proportionate with the 
affect the alcohol has had. 
Then there was another legal twist the B.C. Supreme Court had to deal with. 
* R. v. ROBSON (1985) 19 C.C.C. (3d) 137. 
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In 1985 the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with an Ontario case regarding 
police, road checks and drinking drivers.* The events that caused the 
drinking driving charges against Mr. Dedman in that case occurred in 1980, 
some two years before the Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into effect. 
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the right to drive on our highways is 
not a fundamental liberty, but a licensed activity. When our B.C. Court of 
Appeal dealt with the constitutionality of s.214 of our Motor Vehicle Act, it 
dealt with circumstances that had occurred since April 17, 1982. In other 
words the Charter was in effect as opposed to the situation in Dedman. The 
B.C. Court of Appeal seems to have been of the opinion that therefore the 
Dedman decision was not binding on them. They found in Robson that driving is 
a right that is a fundamental liberty under s.7 of the Charter. 
In view of the above the B.C. Supreme Court dealing with this Sengara case 
held that the Robson precedent is the binding one in B.C. This being so, the 
suspension provisions of our Motor Vehicle Act are invalid, unless they are in 
the words of s.l of the Charter "demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society." In other words the legislation that limits a 
constitutional right or freedom must be proportionate to the interest of 
society to protect itself by means of laws. In our fallible society some 
idealisms are legal luxuries we cannot afford while on this side of the pearly 
gates. 
To show the necessity for this offending law that allows the imposition of 
suspensions of the fundamental liberty to drive without independent 
adjudication, the ministry of Attorney General presented evidence of the 
devastating consequences drinking drivers cause in our society, including the 
personal suffering of the victims, the medical costs, insurance premiums, the 
five manhours spent per case by police on each drinking driving case, etc. 
It seems that the main hurdle to overcome was the lack of the 24 hours' 
"relationship to the apprehended degree of intoxication." In other words, is 
the 24 hour period of suspension excessively weighted on the side of 
protecting the public? Is the 24 hour period so 'disproportionate to the 
sobriety of the motorist that it is outright arbitrary and is an irrational 
consideration? The B.C. Supreme Court answered no, in the following words: 
"Having considered the nature of the Charter liberty of a 
right to drive, the pressing and substantial necessity of 
saving the human and financial costs where accidents are 
caused by drinking drivers, in my view the safety margin 
inherent in a 24 our suspension is a reasonable limit 
which is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society". 
Although the provisions of s.214 of the B.C. Motor Vehicle Act do infringe on 
or deny rights and freedoms guaranteed by our Charter they are justified in 
our free and democratic society. 
* R. v. DEDHAN 20 C.C.C. (3d) 97. Volume 22 page 17 of this publication . 
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Mr. Sengara was Convicted of Driving 
While Suspended. 
Please note that in Thompson and Huf sky (see page 10 of this publication) the 
Supreme Court of Canada referred to driving as a licensed activity rather than 
a fundamental freedom. 
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HF.ARSAY EVIDENCE 
THE CONSPIRATOR'S EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE 
Regina v. SCHIAPPACASSE - Vancouver County Court -
No. CC871831 - April 1988. 
Conspiracies and wicked plots do not come about without a considerable amount 
of communication. Needless to say, there is no rule or protocol to such 
communication. It is spread over the spectrum of the plot, among those who 
are parties to it and in many instances involve others. When investigators 
penetrate the plot it is likely that most of the evidence is gained from 
conversations with a variety of people. These conversations are in many 
instances not with or in the presence of those charged with conspiring to 
commit an offence or are alleged to being a party to an offence. Such 
utterances are in such circumstances clearly hearsay and ought to be 
inadmissible. Nonetheless the reliable information gained from the 
communication is essential to prove the allegation. By means of precedents 
the judiciary created "the conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule". 
However, in this case no conspiracy was alleged, only that the accused was a 
party to the substantive offence of drug trafficking by having the criminal 
intent to do so in common with a principal offender (see s.21(2) C.C.). 
C.W., an active trader in illicit drugs, ripped someone off in the system. 
Fearing severe consequences he went to the police offering information and 
cooperation in return for protection. In this scheme of things, C.W. 
introduced an undercover officer to Joanne, his ex-common-law wife. The 
officer purchased some cocaine from her. This transaction did in no way 
involve the accused. However, conversations with Joanne and C.W. provided the 
officer with information that eventually led to the charge of trafficking 
against the accused. The accused was not present when the conversations took 
place, and yet the Crown sought to introduce them into evidence, presumably 
through the officer's testimony. Conceding that the evidence was hearsay, the 
Crown argued that it should be admitted under the conspirator's exception to 
the hearsay rule. This despite the fact that there was no conspiracy alleged, 
but only that the accused had an intent in common with Joanne to traffick 
drugs. For this the Crown relied on cases decided by courts of superior 
jurisdiction including the Supreme Court of Canada.* The County Court trial 
judge agreed that the conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule applies also 
to allegations of substantive offenses where a person is a party to that 
offence by having had an intent in common with someone else to commit that 
offence. 
The two charges against the accused arose from the officer doing business with 
Joanne. On two separate occasions he purchased cocaine from her for an 
aggregate sum of $50,000.00. These incidents were subsequent to the original 
* R. v. SOHJfERS et al (1958) 26 W.W.R. 257 (B.C. Supreme Court). 
R. v. CARTER 67 C.C.C. (2d) 568 (Supreme Court of Canada). 
R. v. B~ (1987 ) 25 S.C.R. 694 (Supreme Court of Canada). 
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purchase when C.W. introduced the officer to Joanne, but at which time the 
conversations, in issue, took place. For the purpose of completing the 
transactions the accused rented adjoining hotel rooms. Joanne and the officer 
were in one room and the accused in the other. For samples, and eventually 
the quantities of cocaine purchased, Joanne went into the accused's room. At 
the conclusion of the second purchase police raided the accused's room and 
found him in possession of cocaine similar in purity to what the officer had 
purchased. 
During the introductory meeting the officer had indicated interest in buying 
larger quantities of cocaine from Joanne. Referring to her supplier she said, 
"My man•, •My guy•. When Joanne spoke subsequently to the officer to make him 
aware of the arrangements for the larger purchase, she said that "My guyn will 
pick a hotel and adjacent rooms to complete the deal. When entering the hotel 
with Joanne the officer asked who all was involved in the transaction. The 
answer was "Just me and my guy" (or words to that effect). She had also 
pointed at the room next door and told the officer, "he's in there". This 
indicated some continuity to prove that the conversations at the introductory 
and subsequent meeting were all about the accused, thereby implicating him in 
this scheme to market cocaine. 
To admit hearsay evidence of this kind (the conversations) there are some 
prerequisites the trier of fact must consider (jury and of course the trial 
judge when sitting alone): 
1. There must be no reasonable doubt that the alleged conspiracy existed or 
that persons had an intent in common to commit a substantive offence; 
2. Based on all of the evidence admissible against the accused, it must be 
found on the balance of probabilities (not necessarily beyond a 
reasonable doubt) that the accused was a member to the conspiracy or had 
an intent in common with someone else to commit an offence; and 
3. If, the prerequisites in 1 and 2 above have been met, only then may the 
hearsay evidence be considered in the final step to determine if it is 
capable, in combination with all other evidence, to show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused was a conspirator or had a criminal 
intent in common with someone else. 
It should be noted that it is not only the statements of others involved in 
such plots, but also their acts that are admissible against an accused person. 
In this case, the trial judge found that all prerequisites had been met by the 
Crown and that Joanne's conversations with the officer that implicated the 
accused in the plot were admissible in evidence. 
Accused Convicted on Both Counts of 
Trafficking in Cocaine. 
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INTERFERENCE VIm ARREST OF ANOTHER. PERSON 
IS LAVFOIBESS OF ARREST AB ISSUE TO 
DETERMINE IF ARRESTING OFFICER VAS OBSTR.UC'l'ED? 
Regina v. RILLS - B.C. Court of Appeal -
Vancouver CA007924 - March 1988 
An officer went to the home of Mr. K to investigate a traffic matter. K 
assaulted the officer who went to her patrol car to call for assistance. The 
accused then arrived on the scene and his inquiries into what was happening 
resulted in advice from the officer not to become involved. When assistance 
arrived K was arrested, presumably for the assault. As one of the officer's 
laid hands on K, the accused approached the scene. He was warned to stay away 
and that any interference would result in a charge of obstruction. He did not 
heed this advice and an altercation ensued between the accused and the 
officers that in addition to obstruction resulted in charges of two counts of 
assault causing bodily harm and two counts of common assault. 
The jury trial resulted in a conviction on the obstruction charge only. The 
arguments before the court had been about the lawfulness of the arrest of K. 
If that arrest was not proven to be lawful, then the officers were not in the 
lawful performance of their duty reasoned defence counsel. However, the trial 
judge apparently explained to the jury that had K, the person upon whom the 
arrest was affected, obstructed the officers then the lawfulness of the arrest 
would be prerequisite to a conviction of obstruction. He did tell the jury 
that where a party who interferes in the arrest of another person, the 
lawfulness of that arrest is irrelevant to charges of obstruction against the 
interfering party. This is erroneous claimed the accused before the B.C. 
Court of Appeal when he appealed his conviction. Said the Court of Appeal in 
response: 
" ... whether an unlawful arrest would en~itle a person who 
was being arrested to resist the arrest might be a defence 
to a charge of assaulting or resisting a peace officer is 
not a factor upon which a third party could rely when 
* charged with this offence." 
Appeal Dismissed. 
*Also see R. v. SAUNDERS (1977) 34 C.C.C. (2d) 243. 
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LEGAL TID-BITS 
mn.AVFUL CUSTODY AND ARBITRARY DETENTION 
The accused was arrested at 11:00 p.m. on Friday for beating his wife. He was 
released at 11:00 a.m. on Sunday. During the 36 hours of custody he did not 
appear before a Justice of the Peace, and consequently, the custody was not 
only unlawful (contrary to s. 454 C.C.) but also arbitrary and an infringement 
to the accused's right under s. 9 of the Charter. Despite this infringement 
the trial judge convicted the accused, but remedied the Charter violation by 
reducing the accused's sentence. The accused appealed his conviction to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal claiming that the infringement of his right 
should have been remedied by quashing the assault charge. This Court held 
that every infringement needs to be remedied but not necessarily by means of 
the most potent means in the court's arsenal. The courts have a discretion 
or duty to implement the remedy that is adequate and appropriate. To remedy 
this infringement by reducing the sentence was adequate and appropriate held 
the Court of Appeal. 
R. v. CHARLES, 36 C.C.C. (3d) 286. 
****** 
PR.OHIBITIO.N TO SOUCIT FOR PURPOSE OF PR.OSTITUTION AND FR.KED0K OF SPEECH 
The two accused were acquitted in the Alberta Provincial Court for soliciting 
despite the fact that they had very specifically offered a police officer 
sexual gratification for money. The trial judge had found that s.195.l(l)(c) 
C.C. was inconsistent with the Charter and therefore without force or effect. 
The Crown appealed this decision to the Alberta Court of Appeal. This Court 
found that the enactment indeed did restrict the freedom of speech for the 
purpose of earning a livelihood with prostitution. However, this law was the 
least intrusion to resolve a nuisance and pursue a valid objective--to provide 
peaceful passage for the public on the public streets. 
Crown's Appeal Allowed. 
Acquittals Vacated and Convictions 
Substituted. 

